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Draft Recommendation
on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU and the reunification of Germany
make necessary a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty:
(ii) Considering that certain provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer meet European
security requirements but are obstacles to harmonious co-operation between member countries in
security and defence matters,
(iii) Considering that WEU is required to take its place, together with the Community and political
co-operation, in a European union whose responsibilities will be extended to include security and
defence matters;
(it') Considering that the North Atlantic Treaty is still essential for the security of Europe as a whole;
(v) Considering that the new order of peace and security that the CSCE is in the process of estab-
lishing throughout Europe calls for a demonstration of a collective European will to ensure respect for
the principles set out in the Paris Charter;
(vi) Considering that WEU is strll essential for any co-ordinated action by member countries outside
the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty,
RrcorurrragNos rHAT lrr CouNctl
l. Examine without delay the changes to be made to the modified Brussels Treaty to adapt it to the
new circumstances;
2. To this end, take into consideration the draft treaty proposed by the Assembly as follows:
The high contracting parties
Resolved:
To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the European
Convention on Human Rights;
To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the
constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;
To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are
already united;
To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create a firm basis lor the European
economy;
To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
provisions adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;
To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;
To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals
and animated by the like determination;
Determined to pursue their action to organise the integration of their economies, their eco-
nomic, social and cultural co-operation, their legitimate collective defence and the organisation of
security and co-operation in all European countries;
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Have agreed as follows:
Anrrcle I I
Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to
play fully their due rdle in organising a new order of peace and security in Europe and maintaining
peace and economic and social development in the world, the high contracting parties will co-ordinate
their action in the various organisations helping to attain these aims.
The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the
Council referred to in Article VI, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of,
or prejudice to, the work of other organisations in which the high contracting parties are or may be
represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.
Anrrclr II 2
In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them
under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
While retaining the right to prepare for any military operations they may deem necessary, the
Council and its subordinate bodies will ensure that there is no overlapping with NATO civil and mil-
itary bodies and will pursue a continuing exchange of information and opinions with them.
Anrtcln III 3
If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other
high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5l of the Charter of the
United Nations. afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their
power.
Anrlcle IV a
All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The present treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the high contracting parties
under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any
way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Anrtclr V 5
The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the interna-
tional engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third
state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty.
None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition
directed against any other of the high contracting pa(ies.
AnrrcrE VI 6
1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging
the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between them and with other European
organisations, the high contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty create a Council to consider matters
concerning the execution of this treaty.
l. Amended text.
2. Former Article IV amended.
3. Former Article V. amended rn French.
4. Former Article VI.
5. Former Article VII.
6. Former Article VIII amended.
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2. This Council is known as the " Council of Western European Union "t it is so organised as to be
able to exercise its functions continuously: it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered
necessary.
3. At the request of any of the high contracting parties. of the European Council or of thc Assembly.
the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to concert their approach to any
challenge to security and co-operation in Europe or to the application of arms limitation conventions
and to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise.
4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has
been or may be agreed.
Anrrclr VII 7
The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an
assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accordance with the same cri-
teria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Anrlcle VIII8
In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the high
contracting parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:
The high contracting parties will, while the present treaty remains in force, settle all disputes
falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
by referring them to the court, subject only, in the case of each of them. to an1, reservation already
made by that party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that party
may maintain the reservation.
In addition, the high contracting parties will submit to concihation all disputes outside the scope
of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation rs appropriate and
other questrons for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any party to the dispute shall have the
right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.
The preceding provisions of this article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or
agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.
Anrrclr IX e
The high contracting parties may decide, by joint agreement. after the Council has consulted the
Assembly, to invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between
them and the state so invited.
Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing an instrument of accession
with the Belgian Government.
The Belgian Government will inform each of the high contracting parties of the deposit of each
instrument of accession.
Anrrclr Xro
The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon
as possible with the Belgian Government.
It shall be considered to enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratifi-
cation of the 1954 Paris Agreements and will remain in force for fifty years. After the expiry of the fifty
years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided
that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.
The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other high contracting parties of











(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporleur)
L lntroduction
1. The revision of the modihed Brussels
Treaty became necessary with the accession of
Portugal and Spain. For that reason, the Council
decided to examine this question but, noting
that the governments were having difficulty in
reaching agreement on the tenor of a new text,
its progress was pnldently slow. This is no cause
for criticism since ,;vents in 1989 and 1990 radi-
cally changed the facts that had to be taken into
account for achieving this aim.
2. (l) Although the reunification of Germany
means that Germztny has now inherited all the
commitments enlered into by the Federal
Republic, including those in the Washington
and modified Brussels Treaties, it has elimi-
nated the reasons for several of the protocols
making up the 19154 Paris Agreements, which
protocols may nov/ be considered null and void
iogether with the provisions of the treaty itself
which refer to them.
3. (ii) The decision taken by the Twelve in
Rome in December 1990 to build up, in the
framework of a European Council whose
responsibilities ar,; already greater than those
devolving on the Economic Community,
European co-operation extending to security
and defence matters, raises in new terms the
question of WEIJ's place in the European
system. Any revision of the treaty will obviously
have to bear thts in mind.
4. (iii) The threat brought to bear by the
Warsaw Pact has :;teadily diminished in the last
two years, giving lvay to great uncertainty about
the future of sev,:ral Eastern European coun-
tries, including thr: Soviet Union, and the risks
they may represe'nt for peace in Europe. The
countries of the Atlantic Alliance for their part
have had to reerssess the way they should
organise themselves to meet the requirements of
the new situation tn view ofthe sharp reduction
in the American military presence in Europe
which has already started and will probably be
accelerated. The modified Brussels Treaty is
strongly marked by the confrontation between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact since this was the
dominating concern of Europeans at the time it
was drawn up. Although, in the main, it still
meets the requirelnents of European security in
a new era, its relision must take into account
the obsolescence of some of its provisions.
5. It was fashirtnable in recent years to make
calumnious attacks on WEU and its past. It has
been called the sleeping beauty and, when the
question was being examined of abolishing the
ACA and the SAC and then the agencies created
in 1987, they were readily accused of ineffi-
ciency, inability and laziness. This " little
known " organisation was willingly sneered at
and its " discretion " was compared with the
" brilliance " of NATO or the European Com-
munity. All these direct or indirect attacks led to
the idea that WEU should be wound up on the
grounds that it would jeopardise NATO
cohesion or the development of the Community.
To be fair, it should first be recalled that an
intergovernmental organisation can only be
what the governments of the member countries
wish it to be. The mediocrity of the SAC's work
was attributable to the governments, not the
organisation, as was the fact that the 1987
agencies were allowed no initiative and
therefore made only a limited contribution to
the establishment of defence Europe. Con-
versely, if one considers the aims the signatories
of the Paris Agreements agreed to assign to
WEU, one has to express a very different
opinion on its action. The need to revise the
modified Brussels Treaty does not stem from
failure to implement it but on the contrary from
its success.
6. (a) Their first aim was to ensure peace and
security in Western Europe. This has been
attained in full.
(b) They intended to promote the unifi-
cation of Europe, placing defence in the
framework of integration. From this point of
view, the establishment of the European Eco-
nomic Community, its enlargement and subse-
quent confirmation are an essential part of the
implementation of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
(c) The Federal Republic was to be asso-
ciated with the organisation of European
security. This association became an undeniable
fact and the preventive measures that existed for
Germany in 1954 have almost all disappeared.
(d) The signatories sought to ensure
United Kingdom participation in the building of
Europe. ln fact, for several years WEU was a
bridge between the United Kingdom and the
EEC and the British accession in 1972 was an
important step in the implementation of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
(e) During the crisis in relations between
France and NATO in 1967, WEU helped to
maintain co-operation between France and the
NATO member countries in areas within its
DOCUMENT 126I
purview. with the result that there is no longer
much doubt about France's effective partici-
pation in a western security system, nor about
that of Spain. whose armed forces are not inte-
grated in the NATO commands either.
(fl ln t987. for the first time, the first war
in the Gulf allowed member countries to take
part in concerted operations outside Europe. In
1990, this initiative was repeated on a new scale.
7. Your Rapporteur is well aware that some
consider it would have been better for Europe's
participation in NATO's activities not to pass
through an intermediary such as WEU. Others
believe the European Community alone should
embody the will of Europeans to organise them-
selves in security and defence matters. WEU's
great merit has been to achieve an acceptable
synthesis of all these aspirations. Without it, the
unity of Western Europe would have been
impossible, be it in NATO or in the Com-
munity. However important the changes that
occurred in Europe in 1989 and 1990, they in no
way affect the application of the modified
Brussels Treaty but confer new importance on it.
However, this importance will depend largely on
how the NATO member countries manage to
define the r61e of that organisation at thejuncture now approaching and, on the other
hand. how far the twelve Community member
countries wish bodies directly connected with
that institution to be extended.
8. These observations lead to the conclusion
that a treaty of alliance must not include details
too closely linked with present circumstances. It
must provide a general framework allowing gov-
ernments to agree on practices that may be
abandoned as and when necessary. For instance,it is understandable that in 1954 the Seven
wished to put an official stamp on very detailed
commitments in regard to the limitation and
control of armaments. This is the purpose of
Protocols Nos. II, III and IV of the Paris Agree-
ments, which form part of the treaty. However.
the governments have since found them embar-
rassing from time to time. In the present period
of uncertainty about the organisation of
European security, it seems undesirable to
include in an international treaty provisions
which might better be reserved for Council deci-
sions, subject to revision whenever governments
so wish. Conversely, the fact that some provi-
sions of the modrfied Brussels Treaty are no
longer applied because they no longer corre-
spond to present-day realities weakens the credi-
bility of the governments' will to respect a most
essential part of their commitments. A first con-
clusion will thus be that the text should be a
short one.
9. Furthermore, the main part of the text
should relate to the new situation in Europe.
Admittedly, there seems to be a need for certain
provisions to be changed, but these are few and
limited in scope. The governments themselves
noted this at the meeting of the European
Council in Rome in December 1990 and at the
meetings in Brussels on 4th February which led
to the first steps being taken towards organising
twelve-power Europe associating WEU with the
European Community: setting aside all pro-
posals involving the disappearance of WEU and
the establishment of a political Europe in a
strictly Community framework, they paid par-
ticular attention to a Franco-German proposal
to juxtapose WEU and political co-operation in
the framework of a political union on behalf of
which WEU would. as Mr. Dumas said. act on
the union's behalf in security and defence
matters and work out proposals for the union's
institutions in these areas. This corresponds
very closely to the guidelines laid down for
WEU in the Preamble and Article I of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty.
10. Finally, if our Assembly wishes to makeits voice heard, it should expless its views
without delay. The first results of the work of the
Twelve indicate that the latter will manage toput in writing the architecture of political
Europe by the beginning ol summer 1991. This
wrll be a decisive step directing everything that
follows. By explaining before that date how it
believes the treaty should be revised, the
Assembly will be able, further to the opinion it
expressed in December 1990 on the revision of
Article IX when adopting the recommendation
presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of
the Political Committee (Document 1250), to
initiate a true dialogue with the governments on
the building of the European union.
I l. However, it is not for the Assembly to
replace the legal experts who will have to settle
the terms of the future treaty. Its impetus must
remain political and, although your Rapporteur
is trying to set out in the text of an article his
views on what the future treaty should be, the
sole aim is to express his ideas as clearly as pos-
sible. without impinging upon the responsibil-
ities of the executive. To demonstrate the
political nature of his thinking, he will conducthis study under three main headings: the
organisation of European security. the political
union of Europe and, lastly, the functioning of
WEU.
12. Finally, your Rapporteur has tried to be
strict in naming institutions or prospective
European institutions. Noting, however, that
neither the press nor the governments were so
strict, he believes it useful to spell out hereafter
the meaning he attaches to the terms he uses,
without, however, necessarily committing the
authors of the quotations in the present doc-
ument.
13. By European union he means the plan
worked out by the nine members of the
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European Communities in Paris in 1972 to
group all the organisations, associating them
under a single steering body, the European
Council, which is not linked to the implemen-
tation of a particular treaty. This was the
prospect mentioned by President Mitterrand
under the heading of European Federation,
whlle politic'al co-operaliorz, founded in Luxem-
bourg in 1970, examines external policy matters,
from which security and defence questions have
hitherto been excluded. The plan for a political
union which, since the meeting in Rome in
December 1990. has been the aim of the inter-
governmental conference, together with the eco-
nomic and monetary union, aims at associating
WEU and political co-operation at an early date
in accordance with the intentions expressed in
the Single European Act, adopled by the twelve
member countries of the Community in 1975.
By European Cornmunity, he means only the
organisation stemming from the Paris and Rome
Treaties creating. respectively, the European
Coal and Steel Community, the European Eco-
nomic Community and Euratom, which have
now been merged. When he refers to the Tw,elve,
your Rapporteur means the member states
acting outside the institutions, just as the Nine
are the member states of WEU since 1988.
Europe of the Thirtt'-Ftve refers to the members
of the Conlbrence on Security and Co-operation
in Europe (CSCE) who, in the Paris Charter of
November 1990, defined the principles of their
organisation in the light of events in Eastern
Europe in 1989 and 1990.
14. Finally, it should be specified that all ref-
erences to the modified Brussels Treaty in this
explanatory memorandum are based on the
treaty as it resulted from the 1954 Paris Agree-
ments, still in force. and not the draft treaty con-
tained in the draft recommendation.
il. Organisation of European security
15. The first objective of the modified
Brussels Treaty is to ensure Western European
security. This was the aim of the signatories of
the 1948 Brussels Treaty, when the Atlantic
Alliance did not yet exist. The Paris Agreements
added other dimensions, but the implemen-
tation of these new provisions was progressively
handed over to other institutions and the
platform of The Hague which, with the
accession of Portugal and Spain, became the
second WEU charter, brings the organisation
back to its initial target. This must therefore be
the basis for any thinking about the future of
WEU.
16. In the situation that prevailed from 1949
to 1989, Western Europe as a whole had to face
only one threat, i. e. that of the Warsaw Pact
divisions deployed defensively in the centre of
Europe at the service of a dominant country and
an expansionist ideology. It was therefore logical
for WEU to relinquish the exercise of most of its
military responsibilities to NATO as the larger
organisation thanks to which the United States
and Canada, with the deterrent power American
nuclear weapons gave the alliance, made a pow-
erful contribution to joint security, while the
participation of Norway, Iceland, Greece and
Turkey extended the necessary guarantees to the
flanks of the system of defence. The aim of
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, which
associates WEU closely with NATO, was to fit
the military dimension of WEU's rdle into the
NATO framework.
17. Developments in Europe in 1989 and
1990 raised questions in some circles about the
need to maintain that association. Considering
the withdrawal of the Soviet means to defensive
positions on Soviet territory, the disintegration
of the Warsaw Pact, progress in disarmament,
the decline of communist beliefs and the
adhesion, demonstrated in the Paris Charter of
November 1990, of all European states to many
of the values thitherto upheld by the West, they
believe NATO should be sacrificed, at the same
time as the Warsaw Pact. to the abolition of mil-
itary blocs and that the collective security of
Europe as a whole should be organised in the
framework of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe. The least one can say is
that uncertainty about the Soviet Union's
internal and external policies and the certainty
that it has retained a large military force most of
which, both nuclear and conventional, escapes
the arms limitation agreements and which is still
being modernised do not allow consideration to
be given to winding up the Atlantic Alliance
which remains, and will probably remain for a
long time to come, the basis of European
security vis-d-vis a threat that has not disap-
peared. Hence there is no need to question the
principle of Article IV of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
18. Conversely, while the first part of that
article seems to be drafted in terms which corre-
spond to both today's and tomorrow's require-
ments. i.e.:
" In the execution of the treaty, the high
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall work
in close co-operation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation "
the same cannot be said of the second part,
which contains several anachronisms:
" Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the
Council and its Agency will rely on the
appropriate military authorities of NATO
for information and advice on military
matters. "
DOCUMENT I26I
19. NATO is in fact no longer the sole source
of information on military matters that concern
Europe's security. Each member of the alliance
participates in its own specific way and many
aspects of these questions are outside the
purview of NATO. NATO for its part complains
of being insufficiently informed about the activ-
ities of WEU.
20. At the close of its ministerial meeting on
l8th December, the North Atlantic Council
issued a communiqu6 setting out in paragraphs
5 and 7 its views on the future of relations
between NATO and the future European
security organisation, as follows:
" 5. The adaptation of our alliance to new
circumstances will include enhancing the
r6le of the European allies with a view to
ensuring a full and equitable sharing of
Ieadership and responsibilities between
Europe and North America. All allies
agree that the foundation ofEuropean sta-
bility and security will continue to be a
strong and viable North Atlantic Alliance
which requires the continuing active
political engagement and significant mil-
itary presence of the North American
democracies in Europe. A European secu-
rity identity and defence r6le, reflected in
the construction of a European pillar
within the alliance, will not only serve the
interests of the European states but also
help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity. In
this context, and as this process evolves,
we will consider how the political and mil-
itary structures of the alliance must be
adapted accordingly.
We support current efforts to strengthen
the security dimension in the process of
European political integration, and
recognise the importance of the recent
decisions of the European Council in
Rome. We emphasise, in this regard, the
importance of safeguarding complemen-
tarity and transparency between the two
processes of the adaptation of the alliance
and of the development of European
security co-operation.
7. Security and co-operation in the
Europe of tomorrow can best be achieved
by a framework of interlocking institu-
tions in which the interests of all
European states can be accommodated.
The three key elements of the European
architecture are the alliance, the process
of European integration and the CSCE.
Each has its own purpose but comple-
ments the others. Our alliance will
provide an essential underpinning to this
architecture, guaranteeing the transat-
lantic dimension of security, providing
effective defence for all the allies, and
contributing to an environment of sta-
bility in which democratic institutions
can be firmly rooted. "
21. If one accepts that the nine WEU coun-
tries are bound by North Atlantic Council deci-
sions and by those of the European Council to
associate WEU with the European union that
the Twelve intend to set up, it would appear
that:
(i) their governments have no intention
whatsoever of sideJining NATO and
entrusting to a solely European
organisation responsibility for their
defence arrangements or even their
policy on disarmament, security and
co-operation in Europe;
(ii) on the contrary, they are anxious to
build a European pillar of the alliance
to consolidate it at both political and
military level;
(iii) this implies the development of new
relations between NATO and WEU
based on greater cohesion of the
European members of the alliance in
defence and other matters and on
mutual openness on the part of both
organisations, a steady exchange of
information, continuing co-operation,
not only at government level but also
at the level of secretariats and
specialised bodies.
Your Rapporteur therefore proposes that the
second part of Article IV be redrafted as
follows:
" The Council and its subordinate bodies
will ensure that there is no overlapping
with NATO civil and military bodies and
will pursue a continuing exchange of
information and opinions with them. "
22. Such wording would not prejudge the
sharing out of military responsibilities between
NATO and WEU. While it seems evident that,
in any event, NATO's main task will continue to
be to organise the defence of member countries
agarnst any form of attack, the new circum-
stances mean planning for cases in which, inside
or outside Europe, deterrence or limited
recourse to force may become necessary to
maintain or restore peace, without the partici-
pation of the great powers being possible or
desired by the WEU countries or required by the
Washington Treaty. The principle that action
must be taken by the largest possible
organisation would allow it to be decided to
what extent it was for NATO or for WEU to
intervene in accordance with decision-taking
procedures specific to each of the two
organisations.
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23. In order to take account of WEU's ability
to act in areas denied to NATO, your
Rapporteur therefore proposes redrafting the
beginning of the second paragraph of Article IV
as follows:
" While retaining the right to prepare for
any military operations they may deem
necessary, the Council and its subsidiary
bodies... "
24. As for the methods laid down in Article
VIII, it is clear that this article corresponds to
two separate intentions: to ensure application of
Protocols Nos. II, III and .Itrl concerning the
levels of forces and armaments of member coun-
tries and to extend allied solidarity beyond the
case of an attack on one of the member coun-
tries. However, the first of these aims is appar-
ently no longer that of member countries today.
Moreover, forty years of WEU history show that
implementation of the protocols, after having
made a major contribution to the creation of the
Europeans' feeling of belonging to a community
in which there was solidarity in security matters,
subsequently harmed the proper functioning
of the treaty because it created inequalities
between commitments imposed on signatories
and finally these texts have now either lost their
importance or they are incorrectly applied.
25. (i) The Federal Republic's renunciation
of the production of certain conventional
weapons was progressively abolished by
agreement between the seven signatory coun-
tries in application of Article II of Protocol No.
III. The one concerning nuclear weapons was
renewed by the Federal Republic's accession to
the non-proliferation treaty and then, again, in
1990 by the so-called two-plus-four treaty on the
final settlement of the German question. Under
this treaty, Germany also confirms its renunci-
ation of the production of chemical and bio-
logical weapons 
- 
regarding which a new treaty
to ban them is now being negotiated in Geneva,
and accepts limits for the level of forces in the
Bundeswehr. The entire system set up by Pro-
tocols Nos. III and IV is therefore pointless
where Germany is concerned.
26. (/il While the United Kingdom was not
compelled to submit its weapons deployed
outside the mainland of Europe to control,
France refused, since its nuclear weapons
entered the effective production stage, to accept
the provisions of Article III of Protocol No. III
because it considered that a commitment which
applied to it alone was discrimination.
27. (iii) The obligations under Article I of
Protocol No. II have been a heavy burden on the
United Kingdom since it abolished military
service; it now has only a professional army,
with limited levels, which has had to be used
several times for operations outside Europe. It
then had to anticipate a WEU Council decision.
On llth January 1991, your Rapporteur put
Written Question 289 to the Council:
" Paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommen-
dation 479 indicates that the modified
Brussels Treaty 'provides no legal basis'
for 'the presence of the forces of one state
on the territory of other WEU states'.
Does the Council mean that Protocol
No. II is no longer in force? If so, when
and why was such a decision taken? "
in order to obtain detailed information on this
point. He is waiting for the answer. When
speaking to the Political Committee on 5th
March 1991, the Secretary-General held that
Protocol No. II implied commitments only for
the United Kingdom but that it remained fully
in force, thus correcting the reply to Recommen-
dation 4'79. lt remains to be seen whether the
commitments in that protocol were effectively
fulfilled in summer 1990 and why the Assembly
has still not been notified of any Council deci-
sions relating to cuts in the British Army of the
Rhine to meet the Gulf crisis. Your Rapporteur
considers it quite normal that, in the circum-
stances, such a decision should have been taken,
but he still does not know whether the rules laid
down in Protocol No. II were effectively
respected and he considers it abnormal that the
Assembly was not duly informed.
28. (iv) Portugal and Spain are subject to
none of the obligations laid down in Protocols
Nos. II, III and IV since their forces were not
included in the " Special Agreement annexed to
the Treaty on the Establishment of a European
Defence Community " signed in Paris on 27th
May 1952, referred to in Article I of Protocol
No. II.
29. (vj Since France's withdrawal from the
NATO integrated military structures, all French
armed forces have been assimilated to " internal
defence and police forces " in accordance with
Article V of Protocol No. II which makes no
provision for national armed forces other than
those assigned to NATO. This is obviously a
point on which the 1954 Paris Agreements are
no longer adequate.
30. (vr) Overall, the maximum force levels
laid down in the treaty of 27th May 1952 no
longer correspond to Europe's possibilities or to
its needs today. No one in Western Europe is
reproaching its neighbours for having too many
arms but each country would like the others to
have more arms so that they may play a greater
part in joint security. The limits laid down in
Protocol No. II are therefore now pointless.
31. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes that
Protocols Nos. II, III and IV be deleted and,
consequently, the parts of Article VIII of the
treaty that refer to them, i.e.:
- 
in paragraph l: " and of its protocols
and their annexes ";
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in paragraph 2: " in particular it shall
establish immediately an Agency for
the Control of Armaments whose func-
tions are defined in Protocol No. IV ";
- 
in paragraph 4: the second and third
sentences.
32. These proposals do not take account of
two possibilities that have sometimes been
envisaged:
(a) no. 
.longer_ fixing^ maximum but
mlnrmum levels of armaments that
member countries would undertake to
place at the service of European
security. This does not rule out the
idea that member states might agree,
in the framework of the Council, to fix
maximum levels, but your Rapporteur
believes that at the present juncture
there can only be decisions linked
with changing circumstances and that
member states should not therefore be
bound by a treaty article;
(b/ introducing procedure for majority
decisions on important matters
relating to European security. Your
Rapporteur would not be against the
introduction of such procedure but he
believes that member states are not
yet ready to accept it. It is better not
to create new commitments than to
have to close one's eyes to their non-
application, as was too often the case
for the parts of Article VIII that it is
proposed to delete.
33. The other aspect of Article VIII, which
makes WEU the instrument of European
security, on the contrary corresponds to today's
requirements, probably even better than to those
of 1954. In particular, it should be underlined
that, in paragraph /, it is stated that the Council
was created " for the purposes of strengthening
peace and security and of promoting unity and
of encouraging the progressive integration of
Europe and closer co-operation between [thehigh contracting partiesl and with other
European organisatrons ", thus fully justifying
the approach adopted by the Twelve since their
Rome meeting to associate WEU more closely
with European political co-operation with a
view to preparing the future European union.
Similarly, paragraph 2, laying down that the
Council " shall be so organised as to be able to
exercise its functions continuously " and that
" it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be
considered necessary " leaves the way clear for
the Council to take all the decisions necessary
for adapting it to the new situation. It is
therefore empowered to decide, as soon as gov-
ernments agree, to move closer to NATO or to
the European Community by moving its seat or
appointing, as part of the Permanent Council,
the permanent representatives of member coun-
tries either to NATO or to the Community. It is
to be hoped that decisions in this sense will be
taken before the treaty is revised.
34. The question will immediately arise of
whether the permanent representations of
member countries to NATO or the Commu-
nities will have to form the WEU Permanent
Council. Such a decision naturally means
choosing WEU's future course and not only at
symbolic level because in some cases
co-ordination will be better ensured in one
organisation or the other and the governments
will presumably find it difficult to agree on this
point. An easy way out would be for each of
them to decide the matter in its own way, which
would have the serious disadvantage of intro-
ducing into the WEU Council, in addition to the
usual divergences between government policies,
differences stemming from the approaches
of their respective representations. Your
Rapporteur believes twofold co-ordination
would be better ensured, at least until an overall
decision is taken by the nine governments on
relations between the three organisations, if the
Council were formed of specific permanent gov-
ernment representatives to WEU who would
obviously be responsible for maintaining close
relations with the representations to NATO and
to the Community.
35. In the same way, due to its vagueness, the
notion of a subsidiary body seems particularly
appropriate: it means a body introduced to help
a principal organ and, while the treaty made the
Agency for the Control of Armaments such a
body, the Council announced, when setting up
the WEU Institute for Security Studies, that it
was acting in application of Article VIII,
paragraph 2. There is no doubt that the Standing
Armaments Committee, set up by a Council
decision, was covered by the same article, like
the three agencies which operated from 1987 to
1990. It may also be considered that the Coun-
cil's working groups and also the Committee of
Chiefs of Staff set up on the occasion of the Gulf
crisis are subsidiary bodies of the Council, as
would be the WEU satellite centre that the
Council seems to be in favour of creating, if the
reply to Recommendation 482 rs to be believed.
The fact that the IEPG now submits an annual
report on its activities to our Assembly also
places it, wirh FINABEL, in the family of WEU
subsidiary bodies. In practice, the vagueness of
this notion has the advantage of allowing non-
member countries of WEU which, on certain
matters, pursue similar aims, to be associated
with a specific activity without necessarily
having to accede to the treaty. Already, the SAC
agreements were open to NATO countries that
were not members of WEU. During the Gulf
crisis, as from 20th August 1990, the
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council invited
certain member countries of the Community or
of NATO which were not members of WEU to
l0
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attend ministerial meetings on this subject. In
the uncertain days ahead, particularly now that
some countries which are still members of the
Warsaw Pact are thinking of tightening their
links with Western Europe, it seems desirable
for possibilities of this kind to remain open, as is
the case with the present wording of paragraph 2
of Article VIIL To some extent this also meets
the wishes of member countries of NATO or of
the EEC which have applied to join WEU but in
respect of which member countries would not
wish to subscribe to the commitments in Article
V of the treaty. Whenever necessary, it may also
allow representatives of the European Com-
mission to be associated with the activities of
such bodies at the appropriate level. Finally, the
Political Committee decided to draft paragraphs
I and 2 of Article VIII in the present, and not
the future. tense.
36. Paragraph J of Article VIII is of particular
importance since it gives the WEU Council a
worldwide mandate by encouraging the high
contracting parties " to consult with regard to
any situation which may constitute a threat to
peace, in whatever area this threat should arise,
or a danger to economic stability ". It should be
noted, however, that the English text of this
paragraph differs slightly from the French text
since it uses the expression " to consult " while
the French says " se concerter ". It may be
accepted that in the two languages the meaning
of " to consult " and " to concert with each
other " is fairly close. To concert means " union
or agreement in any undertaking ", which natu-
rally includes consultation, but goes further in
the sense of preparing for joint action. In any
revision of the treaty, the two texts should natu-
rally be aligned and there are two reasons for
proposing that the English text should be lined
up with the French: " to concert " is more
binding on governments, without going so far as
to create the obligation to take joint action, and,
above all, the governments have already under-
taken to do this in paragraph lll (a) 4 of the
platform of The Hague, which specifies that they
will " concert our policies on crises outside
Europe insofar as they may affect our security
interests ". In this case, the English text corre-
sponds exactly to the French.
37. It is worth noting that the obligations of
members of the Atlantic Alliance and of WEU
are rather different in the Washington Treaty
and in the modified Brussels Treaty, but there is
some ambiguity about the interpretation of the
former whereas the latter has the merit of
greater clarity. Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty provides that " The parties will consult
together whenever, in the opinion of any of
them, the territorial integrity, political indepen-
dence or security of any of the parties is
threatened ", whereas Article VIII of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty justifies such consultations
by " a threat to peace, in whatever area this
threat should arise ". Neither is set within a spe-
cific area but it was logical, on the occasion of
the Gulf crisis, for the same countries to support
Turkey against a possible Iraqi aggression in
accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty because this was a threat to the security
of a NATO member country but to take part in
operations co-ordinated by WEU in the Gulf
because this was to meet a threat to interna-
tional peace. In fact, Article 4 of the Washington
Treaty leaves room for discussion on the places
and cases for consultation, which is not the case
of the modified Brussels Treaty.
38. In paragraph 8 of its reply to Recommen-
dation 489. the Council gave a useful pointer to
the new meaning it intends to give to Article
VIII and which corresponds perfectly to the
wishes expressed by the Assembly:
" Defence solidarity is the fundamental
link binding WEU member states. In
adapting the modified Brussels Treaty,
the aim will be to update its provisions
and to take advantage of the prospects
offered by the new European context. The
changes to be made to the treaty at the
appropriate time will inevitably stress the
responsibilities assumed by member
states in the defence of their common
security interests. "
39. The purpose is obviously to use WEU to
strengthen the order of peace and security in
Europe that the CSCE is in the process of estab-
lishing and whose most recent definition is given
in the Paris Charter of November 1990. The
governments may also have in mind the appli-
cation of the CFE agreement and, more gen-
erally, arms limitation agreements. However, it
does not seem very desirable to introduce into
the text of the treaty too specific an allusion to a
particular text or institution which may soon be
overtaken by events or replaced. Conversely, it
no longer seems necessary to ask the WEU
Council to concert their approach to situations
which are " a danger to economic stability ",
since such responsibilities are already exercised
by the Twelve in other forums.
40. Finally, your Rapporteur considers the
treaty should take account, in that paragraph, of
the links that the Twelve wish to establish
between the European Community, political
co-operation and WEU. It might lead to the
Chairmanship-in-Office of the European
Council, which may, as matters now stand. be
held by a non-member country of WEU, and the
Chairman of the European Commission being
given the right to ask for the WEU Council to be
convened and, possibly, to attend such meetings
for matters of concern to both organisations.
Furthermore, the Political Committee decided
to ask for the inclusion in the treaty ofthe right




41. In the light of these remarks, paragraph 3
of Article VIII might be drafted as follows:
" At the request of any of the high con-
tracting parties. of the European Council
or of the Assembly, the Council shall be
immediately convened in order to permit
them to concert their approach to any
challenge to security and co-operation in
Europe or to the application of arms limi-
tation conventions and to any situation
which may constitute a threat to peace, in
whatever area this threat should arise. "
42. Paragraph 4 of Article VIII would be con-
siderably lightened by the removal of Protocols
Nos. II, III and IV since all the cases in which
the Council had to take decisions by a majority,
qualified or not, would have disappeared. Any
attempt to extend such decisions to other areas
does not seem to correspond to what member
states are now prepared to accept, but the possi-
bility might be kept open by drafting the
paragraph as follows:
" The Council shall decide by unanimous
vote questions for which no other voting
procedure may be agreed. "
43. Naturally, the essential provision of the
modified Brussels Treaty is the one contained in
Article tr{ completed by Articles VI and VII.
Because this article provides for mutual " aid
and assistance " in the event of an armed attack
on any of the high contracting parties in Europe,
it gives the treaty special deterrent value, in par-
ticular because it stipulates that this assistance
shall be afforded with " all the military and
other aid and assistance in their power'i thrrs
associating the nuclear weapons of WEU
member countries with joint defence, while
leaving each one free to decide how to use the
means at its disposal, and this should of course
be maintained, together with the two articles
drawing the consequences of that solidarity.
44. Here again, the only rectification that
should be made is due to a difference between
the English and French texts. The former lays
down that this assistance is guaranteed in the
event of an " armed attack ", while the second
refers to an " agression arm6e ". In this case, too,
the two languages distinguish between an attack,
which is a fact, and an aggression, which implies
a political decision on this fact, since it is an
unprovoked attack. It might therefore, in certain
cases, be argued that an attack on a member
country is not an aggression. Hence, your
Rapporteur proposes that the French text be
brought into line with the English because there
are no loopholes in the latter. He feels that the
level of mutual confidence between member
states, their consistent policies in international
affairs and the development of consultations
allow them all to subscribe to a commitment
thus worded. Moreover, he sees no reason to
touch Articles VI and VII.
III. The political union of Europe
45. It is remarkable that, prior to the creation
of the European Economic Community. the sig-
natories of the modified Brussels Treaty endeav-
oured to place WEU in the framework of " the
unity " and " the progressive integration of
Europe ", as laid down in the sixth paragraph of
the preamble to the treaty. Article I refers to the
economic dimension of the treaty, indicating
that economic co-operation " will be effected
through the [WEU] Council " but that the latter
" shall not involve any duplication of ... the
work of other economic organisations in which
the high contracting parties are or may be repre-
sented ". Article II extends WEU's responsibil-
ities to social matters, while relying on
" specialised agencies " to define a social policy
and conventions between them on its appli-
cation to social security. Article III also leaves
the definition of a European cultural policy to
such conventions. It should be noted that, while
A(icle I and the preamble were amended in
1954, Artrcles II and III in their present form
date back to 1948. It is therefore quite logical
that the Council should have relinquished the
exercise of its cultural and social responsibilities
to the Council of Europe and, after the accession
of the United Kingdom to the Rome Treaty, the
exercise of its economic responsibilities to the
Community. It cannot therefore be claimed that
the modified Brussels Treaty was due to any
special initiative ofthe seven signatory countries
of the Paris Agreements. On the contrary, it
reflects a vast European policy of which the cre-
ation of the Council of Europe was a first stage
and that of the various communities now
grouped in the European Economic Community
an essential part.
46. However, it should be noted that the pre-
amble refers to " the progressive integration of
Europe " and not to Western Europe alone. This
means that the enlargement of the Council of
Europe and the extension of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe also corre-
spond to the aims of the signatories and that
only insofar as it shows its openness towards
Europe as a whole does the Community live up
to their intentions. Those countries did not want
WEU to be just a pillar of the Atlantic Alliancebut also an instrument of the peaceful
organisation of Europe as a whole. Some states,
hitherto members of the Warsaw Pact, therefore
quite rightly consider that their rapprochement
with the European Community, now under way,
also implies developing their relations with
WEU. Moreover, the Assembly for its part has
opened its sessions to parliamentary observers
from non-member countries of WEU, as the
Council has done in certain cases.
47. Hence there is no reason to consider that
the atmosphere of d6tente, understanding and
co-operation that has prevailed in Europe since
t2
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1989 calls in question the existence or vocation
of WEU. On the contrary, it encourages them. In
this area, the revision of the Brussels Treaty
should therefore not take WEU along new paths
but merely terminate certain archaisms and,
above all, spell out the relationship between
WEU and the other organisations leading to
European union.
48. Since the meeting of the Twelve in Rome
in December 1990, the question of relations
between WEU and the European Community
has effectively been studied by the governments
in the intergovernmental conference on political
union whose first meeting at ministerial level
was held in Brussels on 4th February. The
question was also studied by the WEU Council
at its ministerial meeting in Paris on 22nd Feb-
ruary. According to information obtained by
your Rapporteur, while the Twelve seem to
agree that there should be some degree of rap-
prochement between WEU and the Community,
they differ about the nature of such a rap-
prochement.
(a) Italiaa proposal
49. On 4th February, Italy presented a doc-
ument proposing that the member states of the
Community undertake to ensure close
co-ordination and harmonisation with the activ-
ities of WEU with a view to the latter's
enlargement and strengthening and its pro-
gressive integration in the Community, possibly
in 1998, the date on which, according to the
Italian document, individual member states
may cease to be parties to the modified Brussels
Treaty. To that end, WEU might be placed
under the aegis and authority of the European
Council. At the same time, the secretariat of the
European Council for foreign policy would be
entrusted to the Secretariat-General of the Com-
mission of the Community. The latter would be
closely associated with defining and imple-
menting joint foreign and security policy for
which it would have a right of initiative, while
the European Parliament would be given wide-
ranging responsibilities in these areas. The
Council's decisions would be taken by consensus
in security matters when they relate to principles
and by qualified majority when it is a matter of
implementing them. Finally, the Italian doc-
ument says a joint security policy should be
developed in all these sectors with a view to
achieving a joint defence policy based on a
mutual assistance undertaking. Such a policy
might be applied here and now to industrial
co-operation, transfers of military technology,
negotiations on arms limitation and confidence-
building measures and participation in co-
ordinated military operations, in particular by
mandate from the United Nations.
50. These proposals raise a series of problems.
They are tantamount to abolishing WEU, since
they link the new organisation of European
security with the possibility of member coun-
tries withdrawing from WEU on a date which,
as it will moreover be seen, is debatable. It
would then be rebuilt round a new treaty of
mutual assistance between countries which, in a
new context, would probably not be prepared to
undertake or repeat commitments such as were
accepted in the 1954 Paris Agreements. Security
policy would then be subject to different proce-
dures divided between principles and imple-
mentation, a separation to which it seems dif-
ficult to give a jurrdical or political basis. The
immediate measures foreseen in the Italian pro-
posals include some which WEU has been han-
dling, sometimes for a long time, sometimes
only recently, an exception being the control of
arms exports which member governments have
always excluded from their joint discussions. In
any event, there would have to be an agreement
defining exactly what should be controlled.
Would twelve governments be prepared to go
further than nine governments? This is a moot
question. In fact, the Italian proposal amounts
to the delayed 
- 
but not for long 
- 
absorption of
WEU by the Community, a solution which our
Assembly has always rejected both for itself and
for WEU as a whole.
(b) European Commission proposal
5l. The European Commission published a
proposal at the beginning of March. It is too
long to reproduce in full here, particularly as,
apart from foreign and joint security policy, it
deals with two other matters which are outside
the scope of the present report, i.e. external eco-
nomic policy and development co-operation
policy. The text is in three parts: an explanatory
notice, an appendix (which is in fact a draft
treaty) and comments. Your Rapporteur will
examine that part of the appendix dealing with
foreign and joint security policy.
52. The text seeks solutions to the problems
raised by the coexistence of a twelve-power
European union based on Community prin-
ciples and nine-power co-operation based on a
treaty of alliance between sovereign states. As a
result, the Commission:
(il is quite vague about what it means by
security since it refrains from claiming responsi-
bility for defence matters but in fact admits such
responsibilities for the union. as emerges inter
alia from the inclusion of Article V of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty in the draft treaty;
(ii) includes in the draft treaty the major part
of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in par-
ticular Article V, taken up in full in Article Yl2.
The substance of Article X is included in Article
Yl0, whereas a more detailed adaptation of that
of Article VIII is included in many articles of the
draft treaty, especially Articles Y4 and Yl4. The
l3
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substance of Article IX is also included in
Article Y5, which replaces the WEU Assembly
by the European Parliament. Conversely, ArticleIV, defining relations between WEU and
NATO, is included only vaguely in Articles Y7
and Yl5, so as to make it theoretically possible
for non-member countries of NATO to take part
in a joint security policy:
(iii) distinguishes two areas of external andjoint security policy (Article Y2):
(a) " malters that are deemed to be of
vital interest for the union " by
decision of the European Council, for
which the Commission provides for a
qualified majority decision-taking
procedure for defining " the principles
of the common policy " and deciding
on " action to be taken. whether it is
to be implemented by the union or by
the member states " (Article Y3);
(b) " matters that have not been declared
to be of vital common interest " for
which it advocates procedures for con-
sultation which, by the use of wording
not very binding on member states, is
largely the same as that referred to in
Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty (Article Y4) but with the fol-
lowing provision: " Member states
shall refrain from hindering consensus
and joint action that may flow from
it ". which would be a significant
relinquishment of sovereignty for pos-
sible signatories:
(iv) works out procedures that are, to say the
least, complicated in order to allow at one and
the same time co-operation with NATO and the
participation of non-member countries of
NATO. the maintenance of the fiction of neu-
trality and a military assistance clause,
abstention in taking decisions and implementing
them and participation in a union capable of
taking decisions and acting (Article Yl3);
(v) provrdes both for the participation of
non-member countries of NATO (and WEU) in
the union and the presentation to NATO and
WEU bodies of joint union positions stemming
from decisions taken by qualified majority,
which, moreover, does not necessarily imply
that there was such a majority among members
of the union who are members of NATO or
WEU (Articles Y7 and Yl5. 3). This procedure
would in fact raise few problems in the
framework of WEU all of whose members are
members of the community, but the United
States and NATO have always been extremely
reserved about the formation of a bloc of certain
European countries in the North Atlantic
Council. These reservations would probably be
even stronger if such a bloc were to be
institutionalised so that non-member countries
might play an indirect part in the North Atlantic
Council's decision-taking process;
(vr) gives itself a r6le of initiation, represen-
tation and implementation far exceeding what it
is granted by the treaties in force and making it a
true federal government of Europe. Naturally. it
might be possible to give the Commission such
prerogatives but this would require a funda-
mental revision of those treaties in order to giveit democratic legitimacy and policy responsi-
bility that are now totally lacking.
(vii) Where WEU is concerned, its relations
with the European union are referred to in
Articles Yll and Yl5. as follows:
" The common security policy shall con-
stitute an integral part of the union's
foreign policy. Its purpose shall be to
strengthen security in Europe and to
maintain peace in the world in accordance
with the United Nations Charter. It shall
rest on co-operation within the WEU. Its
long-term objectrve shall be to establish a
common European defence in full com-
pliance with commitments entered into in
the Atlantic Alliance.
l. When deciding on action to be taken
pursuant to Article Y l3(3), the Council
shall also decide whether to refer imple-
mentation of the guidelines it has estab-
Iished to the WEU Council.
2. For the application of paragraph I the
union shall establish with the wEU such
arrangements as may be necessary to
enable member states which are not
members of the WEU and the Com-
mission to attend meetings of the WEU
bodies.
4 The union shall endeavour to make use
of the provisions of Article XII of the
Treaty of Brussels of l Tth March 1948 to
promote the gradual integration of the
WEU into the union. "
53. It can be seen that there is a flagrant con-
tradiction between the will expressed in the first
of these paragraphs to co-operate with WEU and
that expressed in veiled terms in Article Y15.4
to bring about the early disbandment of WEU,
i.e. to base the European union not on an associ-
ation of WEU, political co-operation and the
Community but on the disbandment of WEU
and the inclusion of the contents of the modified
Brussels Treaty in a new twelve-power treaty.
This approach is contrary to the doctrine con-
stantly upheld by our Assembly and implies a
risk of destroying a firmly-based European




54. To sum up, your Rapporteur's opinion on
the Commission's proposal is that it tries to use
institutional procedures that are complicated
and, in his view. very fragile from both a legal
and a practical standpoint in order to remedy
the fundamental political problem that defence
is an essential part of the sovereignty of states
that they do not wish to relinquish. The superi-
ority of the modified Brussels Treaty over this
plan is due to the fact that, starting from reality,
it establishes European co-operation based on
the will of states whereas the Commission's pro-
posal jeopardises sovereignty to an ill-defined
extent and does not produce a Community will
capable of replacing the will of states. It con-
demns the union to paralysis because it would
be based on procedure liable to stifle any initi-
ative and not on political will.
55. If it is borne in mind that, in the last
fifteen years. WEU member states have resorted
to force to defend international law or endan-
gered populations or to restore peace in Zaire,
Chad, Lebanon, the Falklands, Beirut and twice,
in a co-ordinated manner, in the Guli not to
speak of their permanent deterrent action in
Europe in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, it
may be wondered to what extent the procedure
proposed by the Commission, if it had been in
force at that time, would have allowed such
rapid and 
- 
except in the case of Beirut 
-
effective action.
(c) Llnited Kingdom and Netherlands positions
56. The United Kingdom Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr.
Douglas Hurd, expressed a diametrically
opposite position to the press on 4th February,
the same day as the Italian document was pre-
sented. He believes WEU should not be swal-
lowed up in another organisation but, on the
contrary, strengthened so as to be a bridge
between the Community and NATO, the bases
of the collective defence of Europe. The Foreign
Secretary excluded any procedure other than a
consensus for taking decisions in security policy
matters and refused to conceal the disagreement
behind institutional changes. Some may find
this concept of WEU's r6le a minimalist one,
but Mr. van den Broek, in an interview in Le
Monde of Sth February, spoke about relations
between WEU and NATO in similar terms to
those of his United Kingdom colleague. He
added: " I object to the fact that the EEC wishes
to define a jornt security policy without taking
account of countries which are not members of
the Community but which help to protect it, for
instance Norway and Turkey. Furthermore,
three EEC countries are not members of WEU.
The Twelve cannot monopolise European
security policy. "
(d) Franco-German proposal
57. Finally, at the meeting on 4th Februarl',
Mr. Dumas and Mr. Genscher submitted a joint
Franco-German proposal which is in many
respects half way between the Italian proposal or
that of the Commission which is more detarled
and the views of Mr. Hurd and Mr. van den
Broek. The text, which seems authentic fol-
lowing the publication of several shortened or
erroneous verslons. reads as follows:
" I. General aims and concepts
(a) Political union and its member states
are to develop a common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). The mission of the
CFSP will be to extend to all areas of
external relations.
fbl CFSP will have as its objective the
defence of the fundamental interests and
common values of political union in its
external relations. It should in particular
reinforce the security of member states,
contribute to maintaining peace and inter-
national stability, develop friendly rela-
tions with other countries. and promote
democracy, primacy of law and human
rights as well as the economic devel-
opment of all nations.
(c) A common security policy implies the
following:
l. Within the framework of CFSP,
political union should implement a
common security policy in the aim
of setting up a common European
defence system in due course
without which the construction of
European union would remain
incomplete.
2. This implies suppression of the
restrictive indication'political and
economic aspects of security' under
Article 30, paragraph 6 (a) of the
Single European Act.
3. The validity of the commitments
that the partners have undertaken
in the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance and the objectives con-
nected to them should not be ques-
tioned.
4. The Atlantic Alliance, and notably a
permanent United States military
presence in Europe, remains indis-
pensable for European security and
stability.
5. The possibilities given by the
Western European Union should be
put to use. WEU would become the
co-operation channel between
political union and NATO with
15
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a view to ensuring mutual rein-
forcement of European or trans-
Atlantic security structures. As
common European security policy
develops, the formal link estab-
lished between the WEU treaty and
the alliance should be adapted in
accordance.
6. WEU acquisitions should be pre-
served: WEU is founded on a treaty
which includes a specific commit-
ment for mutual defence and insti-
tutes an adequate organisation
which associates foreign affairs and
defence representatives. The 1987
platform underscores the fact that
WEU activities, as a European
defence organisation, are carried
out in the perspective of European
unlon.
7. The Atlantic Alliance as such
should be strengthened by a more
important r6le and greater responsi-
bilities for Europeans as regards
security and defence policies. In this
perspective, a European identity for
security and defence should be
reflected in the development of a
European pillar within the alliance.It is hence necessary to take into
account the interaction between the
development of the security factor
of the union and the transformation
that the alliance undertakes further
to political changes in Europe.
II. Proposals
(a) On these bases, the provisions relating
to co-operation as regards security policy
within political union should be progres-
sively established. To this end, the
European Council should have the juris-
diction to decide what areas of security
policy should be the subject of a common
policy.
(b) As an example, the following elements
could already be listed which should be
tackled within the union framework.
l. Disarmament and control of arma-
ments in Europe. Work in this field
will take on particular importance
after the CSCE summit in 1992.
Co-operation between the Twelve
should make it possible for Euro-
peans to put forward common
positions as a contribution to the
co-ordination taking place within
NATO.
2. Security questions, including peace-
keeping measures in the context of
the United Nations. This should
include the definition of common
positions in the debates on disarm-
ament and the control of arms
within the United Nations.
3. Nuclear non-proliferation. The deci-
sion should be taken, on the base of
results obtained in this field in the
EPC context, to intensify efforts to
implement a common non-proli-
feration policy dealing with all the
aspects examined in the general
debate on non-proliferation policy.
4. Economic aspects of security,
namely co-operation concerning
armaments (including questions
relating to the arms market and
competition) as well as the control
of arms exports (notably for dual-
purpose products, precursors of
chemical and biological arms,
installations and equipment, andballistic technology) should,
because of their link with external
policy, be dealt with in the context
of CFSP. The question of knowing
to what extent these subjects should
also come into the areas of Com-
munity policy in the framework of
Community responsibilities, in
relation to the achievement of the
European internal market and
common commercial policy, should
also be examined. Adequate
co-ordination with the work of
international bodies having juris-
diction in this field, and in par-
ticular the IEPG, should be
studied.
(c) As regards the r6le of the WEU, it
could be stipulated that the WEU makes
up an integral part ofthe European unifi-
cation process. The following points could
be approved concerning this:
l. The work of WEU should be
organised in order to establish
organisational relations between
political union and WEU, thus ena-
bling the WEU, with a view to
being part of political union in
course, to progressively develop the
European common security policy
on behalf of the union.
2. The obligation of aid and assistance
in accordance with the Treaty of
Brussels should be maintained for
as long as no other equivalent com-
mitment exists between political
union member states.
3. The different forms of co-operation
which exist within WEU on security
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and defence matters will be con-
tinued. After a certain period of
time 
- 
during which it will be pos-
sible to put the link between the
union and WEU to the test 
- 
it will
be possible to examine, by 1996 at
the latest, while taking into account
the development of the European
security structure, to what extent
the pertinent stipulations of the
treaty should be revised.
4. Co-operation within the WEU will
be made more operational in the
politico-military areas as well as in
the purely military field, and the
appropriate operational and institu-
tional consequences will be drawn.
(d) ln order to progressively bring WEU
closer to political union, a co-operation in
the sense of co-ordination of work and
complementarity in the distribution of
tasks between the union (CFSP) and
WEU should be sought by using the fol-
lowing methods:
l. European Council decisions on
the principles and guidelines of
common foreign and security
policy should serve as a guideline
for co-operation in the framework
of the Treaty of Brussels.
2. The order and duration of the terms
of office for presidents of political
union and Western European
Union will be harmonised as far as
possible (by adjusting the transi-
tional provisions in the case of
Denmark, Greece and Ireland).
3. The dates and places of political
union council and Western Euro-
pean Union meetings at ministerial
level, as well as certain meetings of
high-ranking officials will be
synchronised.
4. The Secretariat-General of the
Council and the Secretariat-General
of the Western European Union will
finalise appropriate provisions in
order to ensure mutual informa-
tion.
5. Links should be established between
the European Parliament and the
WEU Assembly.
(e) The modified Treaty of Brussels
should be revised in due course in order
to take into account the changes that have
occurred in the European security struc-
tures, mentioned in the present doc-
ument.
(/) ln order to promote co-operation
between the various bodies of the union
and WEU, and given the links between
WEU and NATO, it could be desirable to
transfer WEU administrative divisions to
Brussels.
III. Relations with the European states
which are not WEU members
(a/ Relations between the WEU and
the EC member states which are not
members of WEU will be progressively
strengthened with a view to possible WEU
membership of the above states.
(b) Co-operation between WEU and the
European members of the alliance which
are not EC members should also be
increased. Specific contacts or specilic
forms of co-operation could also be
approved with European members of the
alliance not belonging to political
union. "
58. This proposal corresponds better than the
other three to our Assembly's concerns. It is
obviously far less detailed than the proposal for
a treaty presented by the Commission but it is
basically far clearer in that it lays down rela-
tively clear limits between the responsibilities of
the various organisations that will have a part to
play in the future European union. It thus pro-
vides a framework within which it is possible to
consider a revision of the modified Brussels
Treaty that takes account of a probable future.
The fact that France appears to have endorsed
the proposal to move the seat of the WEU
Council to Brussels is a major concession by that
country. It is likely to give considerable encour-
agement to exchanges with bodies of the Twelve
and NATO, which everyone believes desirable.
Furthermore, the text defers the revision of the
modified Brussels Treaty until after the modifi-
cation of European security structures. This
might mean the task would take longer than the
governments now expect. Moreover, measures
will probably be taken progressively. However,
revision of the modified Brussels Treaty is now
necessary and urgent and your Rapporteur con-
siders it useless and hardly desirable to set out in
the text of the treaty itself provisions which may
be adopted by the governments by other means.
What he proposes is a treaty which opens the
way to such provisions.
59. In any event, compared with the Italian
proposal, the Franco-German proposal has the
twofold advantage of great flexibility and
stricter wording: it expresses similar aims but
subordinates them to what governments might
actually be prepared to accept. Far from advo-
cating the abolition of WEU, it makes it, as an
" integral part of the European unification
process ", the forum for working out joint
security policy under the direction of the
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European Council, thanks to the progressive
development of an " organic relationship
between the political union and WEU ", leading
to WEU being integrated in the political union
after re-examination of the matter. Without
anticipating the governments' decision, it may
be thought this proposal will be positive. Your
Rapporteur therefore feels it might be used to
guide the revision of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
60. However, a difficulty stems from the fact
that the European Council has twelve member
countries, three of which do not belong to WEU,
and, in these circumstances, it is hard to see how
twelve countries could take decisions for imple-
mentation by nine of them. Naturally, the
accession to WEU of the three non-member
countries would solve the problem, provi-
sionally at least, if it were not decided at the
same time to merge the Rome and modified
Brussels Treaties. However, your Rapporteur
wonders whether, at the present juncture, this
merger would be desirable for Europe. Would it
not be better, even for quite a long time, to
renounce a geometrical view of Europe in which
any progress in one area is necessarily accom-
panied by equivalent progress in other sectors
and adopt a more pragmatic concept by which
any progress in one direction might be con-
sidered as progress by Europe, without havrng to
worry too much about what is happening in the
others? Here your Rapporteur is thinking of a
certain form of Community " integrism " whtch,
in the light of a preconceived view of what
Europe should be, refuses the enlargement of
any organisation involved in the unification of
Europe if it is not accompanied by the parallel
enlargement of the other European organisa-
tions. At the present juncture, he feels it would
better for the Europe ofthe next few years to be
a nebula round which various stars orbit without
their link with the whole necessarily being
clearly seen rather than a constellation whose
image reflects one or other figure, designed a
priori in terms of a specific point in time. He
believes the procedure adopted for the Gulf
crisis, when European political co-operation
took all the decisions it could before the WEU
Council met to examine the military implica-
tions of these decisions, non-member countries
being invited to take part if they so wished, is
the best solution to this problem. Thus,
depending on its agenda, the European Council
might meet on a twelve- or a nine-power basis
depending on what the governments wish to do.
Depending on whether it was a matter for the
Rome Treaty or for the modified Brussels
Treaty, the body known as the European
Council would therefore not necessarily be com-
posed in the same way, but in any event it would
be the council of European countries deter-
mined to take action on the questions on its
agenda.
61. It should also be borne in mind that there
is no guarantee that the European Community
will be limited indefinitely to twelve members.
It has decided to postpone until 1992 consider-
ation of the candidatures of certain countries,
including Austria. but will be unable to delay a
decision indefinitely. Moreover, certain members
and non-members of the Communrty have
applied for membership of WEU and the Coun-
cil's decision has been postponed, but the sig-
natory countries' undertaking to work for the
progressive integration of Europe makes it dif-
ficult for them to leave these candidatures unan-
swered for much longer. In response to
Assembly questions on this point, the former
Secretary-General of WEU, Alfred Cahen, said
he believed WEU should open its doors swiftly
to the countries which were already members of
both the EEC and NATO but not to others.
which probably corresponded perfectly to the
requirements of the pre- 1989 situation but
perhaps not to the same degree in the Europe of
today or tomorrow. In fact, the question of the
enlargement of WEU is linked with that of the
direction it will take.
62. (i) Those who consider WEU to be pri-
marily a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
are encouraging it to open its doors to all the
European member countries of NATO without
exception so as not to create inequalities
between these countries. This is the view
expressed by Mr. van den Broek and by the
United States Permanent Representative to
NATO, Mr. Taft, when addressing the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies in London
on 4th February. He insisted that countries that
were not members of WEU should not be left on
one side in NATO.
63. (ii) Those who wish it to be quickly
merged with the Community are very logically
pressing for the accession of the three Com-
munity countries which are not members, which
is far from certain and would not necessarily
strengthen European cohesion in security
matters. Conversely, they are reserved about the
principle of non-member countries of the EECjoining WEU. In this connection, it might be
considered that membership of WEU rvould
prepare for accession to the EEC, as was the case
for the United Kingdom, and that the EEC
should examine candidatures only from coun-
tries that have acceded to the modified Brussels
Treaty.
64. (rlri Those who intend to give priority to
the establishment of a new European order of
peace and security will obviously be more in
favour of countries not belonging to the Atlantic
Alliance becoming associated with WEU and the
Community.
65. While, as your Rapporteur thinks, it is not
desirable to take unanimous. final decisions here
and now, on which the governments are far from
l8
DOCUMENT I26I
agreed, -4rticle IX of the treaty should be kept as
it is because it makes invitations to other coun-
tries subject to the unaninrous agreement of all
the contracting parties. Obviously, the notion of
invitation does not prevent some countries from
applying for membership, but requires a unan-
imous reaction to such applications before they
can be transformed into a formal invitation by
the Council following negotiations, inter alia, on
Article VII and the application of the platform
of The Hague. The precedents of Portugal and
Spain show that this procedure creates no
serious difficulties. Since, in any event, Article
XI leaves no room for an enlargement of WEU
that is not accepted by all member countries,
there is no point in tying oneself down with
principles which. one day or another, ffidy
hamper a development that member states want;
it is better for the treaty to keep to the una-
nimity requirement for any decision relating to
enlargement. The Political Committee asked the
Council, however, to consult the Assembly
before inviting any new states to accede to the
treaty.
66. Your Rapporteur draws the following
conclusions from these various considerations
where the wording of the treaty is concerned:
67. (a) The Prearnble would be maintained,
with the exception of:
O its .lburth paragraph, where " in
Western Europe " should be
deleted to show that WEU's
action may cover the whole of the
Europe of the CSCE and
" European economic recovery "
replaced by " the European
economy " so that the treaty is a
better reflection of the Europe of
today. This paragraph would
therefore read as follows:
" To co-operate loyally and to
co-ordinate their efforts to create
a firm basis for the European
economy. "
This wording would have the
advantage of showing the link
between the economic building of
Europe round the Community
and Europeans' efforts to ensure
their security on the one hand
and this undertaking and that of
the economic development of the
whole of Europe on the other.
(ii) its 
./i.fih paragraph, where it
should be recalled that the Paris
Charter is a basis for organising
European security in the fol-
Iowing words:
" To afford assistance to each
other, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations
and the provisions adopted by
the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe. in main-
taining international peace and
security and in resisting any
policy of aggression. "
(iii) its eighth paragraph, which
should be adapted to the new sit-
uation in Europe and whrch
might be drafted as follows:
" Determined to pursue their
action to organise the integration
of their economies, their eco-
nomic. social and cultural co-
operation, their legitimate col-lective defence and the
organisation of security and
co-operation in all European
countries. "
68. (b) -4rttcle 1 should then be drafted as
follows:
First paragraph:
" Convinced of the close community
of their interests and of the necessity
of uniting in order to play fully their
due r6le in organising a new order of
peace and security in Europe and
maintaining peace and economic and
social development in the world. the
high contracting parties will co-
ordinate their action in the various
organisations helping to attain these
aims. "
Second paragraph:
Only the word " economic " should be
deleted.
69. (c) Article II and Article III on matters
which are effectively handled by other
organisations and the exercise of
which WEU relinquished to the
Council of Europe might usefully be
deleted.
70. These various amendments to the treaty
should bring out more clearly the respective
responsibilities and the nature of relations
between WEU, on the one hand, and the Com-
munity, the Council of Europe and the CSCE,
on the other. They should also make it easier. if
and when necessary. to include the modified
Brussels Treaty in a wider contractual whole, in
which the Rome Treaty would also be included,
which would become the charter of a future
European union.
71. At the committee's meeting in Madrid on
5th March 1991. the Secretary-General of WEU
asked whether greater stress should not be laid
on WEU's membership of the family of the
Twelve by replacing the International Court of
Justice referred to in Article X by the Court of
Justice set up under Article IV of the Rome
Treaty. Close study of the texts leads your
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Rapporteur to rule out this proposal which he
believes does not correspond to the possibilities
offered by present international law. The Rome
Treaty would first have to be revised in order to
extend the responsrbrlities of the European
Court to include matters raised by Article X of
the modified Brussels Treaty. Only in the event
of the Twelve having previously carried out such
a revision could the modified Brussels Treaty
refer to that court matters which, in present cir-
cumstances, are within the purview of the Inter-
national Court alone. It should be noted that the
Commission's proposal to the intergovern-
mental conference expressly rules out, in Article
Yl0, jurisdictional control by the European
Court over areas covered by common external
policy.
IY. The functioning of WEU
72. Since your Rapporteur dealt in Chapter
II, in connection with Article VIII of the treaty,
with the functioning of the Council and its sub-
sidiary bodies, he willingly takes note of Recom-
mendation 490 in which the Assembly, on a
report presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on
behalf of the Political Committee, proposed that
the Councrl draft Article IX as follows:
" The Council of Western European
Union shall make an annual report on its
activities to an assembly of representa-
tives of the Brussels Treaty powers
appointed in accordance with the same
criteria as representatives to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. "
'73. While welcoming this wording, which cor-
responds perfectly to his proposals concerning
Article VIII and the protocols, your Rapporteur
wishes to underline that this is wholly com-
patible with WEU's present position and with
that of a future European union covering
security questions as well as economics and
political co-operation. Any democratic federal
organisation includes dual representation of
nations, on the one hand at federal level, such as
the Community now has with a European Par-
liament elected by direct universal suffrage, and,
on the other hand, at the level of the federated
entities thanks to an assembly in which those
entities are represented, thus implying an
indirect form of representation. The case of
Europe of course differs from those to be found
in history since external policy and defence have
always been among the main responsibilities of
federations whereas economic affairs have very
often remained under the control of the fede-
rated states. However, this does not affect the
principle that the federal assembly has prime
responsibility for federal affairs, the assembly
representing the federated states having, as its
main task, to co-ordinate matters handled by
those states. Today there is naturally no
question of deciding what should be the institu-
tions of a European union based on a federal
principle. However, the wording the Assembly
proposes for Article IX paves the way for a
rational divisron of European parliamentary
responsibilities.
'l 4. Furthermore, to avoid any misunder-
standing, it should be recalled that a parlia-
mentary assembly must derive its powers from a
single source and that it does not seem desirable
to associate in a single assembly parliamen-
tarians elected by direct universal suffrage and
delegations from national parliaments. This in
no way prevents two separate assemblies from
voting on texts on the same subject.
75. Conversely, Article XII, as drafted, has
opened the door to discussions and mistaken
interpretations that your Rapporteur feels it
essential to clarify here. First, many commen-
tators, some of whom claimed to have been
speaking on behalf of the governments of
member countries, have read Article XII as lim-
iting to fifty years the period of validity of the
modified Brussels Treaty. This is quite clearly
an error since, by declaring that " each of the
high contracting parties shall have the right to
cease to be a party thereto " after the expiry of
this period, this article implies beyond any
doubt that the treaty will remain valid for the
other signatory countries. The duration of the
treaty is not specified and, as far as your
Rapporteur knows, no signatory country has
expressed the intention to denounce it once the
fifty-year period expires.
76. A more delicate question is that of the
operative date which started the fifty-year
period during which the treaty will in any event
remain in force for all the contracting parties.
Article X1I specifies that the treaty " shall enter
into force on the date of the deposit of the last
instrument of ratification and shall thereafter
remain in force for fifty years ". This text was
that of Article X of the 1948 Brussels Treaty.
Should it be inferred, therefore, that the count
starts in 1948 or in 1954? Several members of
the Assembly have questioned their govern-
ments on this subject and, if the latter answered,
they always, as far as your Rapporteur knows,
said the treaty came into force in 1948. Inter
alia, this is what emerges from the Italian pro-
posal submitted to the interministerial con-
ference on l2th February 1991. However, none
of them has provided any arguments in support
of this view. On llth January 1991, your
Rapporteur therefore addressed Written
Question 288 to the Council, as follows:
" Article I of Protocol No. I provides that
the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Italian Republic 'accede to the treaty as
modified and completed by the present
protocol'. This protocol thereby set a new
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course for the Brussels Treaty (Articles II
and III). created WEU with its Council(Article IV) and Assembly' (Article V) and
gave it new aims and methods (Protocols
Nos. II, III and IV). All these modifica-
tions and additrons therefore made the
1954 treaty a new treaty that included
only a few of the major common elements
of the 1948 treaty.
Moreover. Article VI of Protocol No. I
specifies that it shall enter into force when
the instrument of accession of the Federal
Republic o1' Germany to the North
Atlantic Treaty has been deposited which
was done on 6th May 1955. Finalll'. Pro-
tocol No. I specifies that Article X of the
Brussels Treaty shall become Article XII
of the new treaty. This article provides
that the treatl' shall 'remain in force for
fifty years' after which 'each of the high
contracting parties shall have the right to
cease to be a party thereto' with one year's
notice.
Can the Council say on what basis some
governments have declared that 1998 is
the date as from which each signatory
country would be entitled to cease to be a
party to the treaty whereas an analysis of
the texts indicates that the date should be
2005? "
He has not yet received an answer.
17. For his part. the President of the
Assembly wrote to the Secretary-General on
l9th December 1990 asking him for his opinion
on this point. The answer. dated l5th January
1991, is worth quoting in full:
" In answer to the question you put to me
in your letter of 19th December 1990
about the Council's views on the problem
of the duration of the modified Brussels
Treaty. I am able to inform you that, in
the framework of the exchanges of l'iews
on the revision of the treaty. the
Secretariat-General proposed to the
Council inter alia, following the publi-
cation of various hypotheses in the press,
that it discuss the interpretation of
Article XII of the treaty. These exchanges
of views have for the trme being been
interrupted pending decisions on the
political union and the restructuring of
NATO and the Council has not yet had an
opportunity to discuss the matter.
In my opinion, you are perfectly right
about the mistaken use in the press of the
term 'expiry' of the treaty. In reality, the
modified Brussels Treaty is a treaty of
indefinite duration which will 'expire'
only when the objectives for which it was
signed hal'e been attarned or, at worst.
when the majority of its members have
withdrawn, making it impossible for the
remaining members to attain them.
As for the date as from which each con-
tracting party would be entitled to
withdrarv from the treaty, I believe that
examination of Protocol No. I shows that
Article XII of the modified Brussels
Treaty (formerly Article X) was not mod-
ified on the occasion of the 1954 Paris
Agreements; hence the instruments of rat-
ification to which it refers cannot be those
ratifying the initial Brussels Treaty (the
modified Brussels Treaty being the result
of the ratification of Protocol No. I and of
the other protocols referred to in
Article I).
Hence it is as from the date of deposit of
the last instrument of ratification of the
initial Brussels Treaty that the fifty-year
period should be counted. "
78. The first paragraph is particularly rnter-
estrng because it clearly suggests that the
Council has little intention of tackhng the
question from a legal standpoint but merely
from that ofexpediency, since it has interrupted
its examination of the question " pending deci-
sions on political union and the restructuring of
NATO ". It is evident that it is not juridical con-
siderations that it is expecting of meetings
outside WEU. Your Rapporteur well under-
stands why the Council is waiting for these deci-
sions before redrafting the modified Brussels
Treaty but he does not understand the need to
wait in order to interpret the existing text unless
it is based on a juridical relativism that he con-
demns.
79. The second paragraph corresponds
exactly with your Rapporteur's views.
80. The third paragraph does not claim to
reflect any views other than those of the Secre-
tary-General, but there is every reason to think
that his views are based on those expressed by
the government representatives. However, his
argument is far from convincing. There seems to
be little reason for distinguishing between
articles of the initial Brussels Treaty taken up b1,
the Paris Agreements and those added or mod-
ified. The authors of the modified treaty took
the Brussels Treaty as a document out of which
they used any parts they needed. In fact, the
modified treaty is a new treaty which includes,
as specified in Article I of Protocol No. I, all
four protocols making up the Paris Agreements.
If one reads what was writtten by alI those who
took part in the negotiations, it is clear that at
that time they intended to retain for fifty years
the arms limitations that they had accepted on
that occasion. Moreover. it is difficult to con-
sider as one and the same treaty two agreements
with totally different aims since the first was
clearly directed against Germany, its preamble
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specifying that the high contracting parties were
resolved " to take such steps as may be held to
be necessary in the event of a renewal by
Germany of a policy of aggression " while the
second was signed by the Federal Republic.
However, it is above all the arguments advanced
in Written Question 288 quoted above that
should lead to the conclusion that the modified
Brussels Treaty is a new treaty that came into
force on 5th May 1955 whose signatories are
entitled to announce their withdrawal. after one
year's notice, only as from 6th May 2005.
Finally. the fact that the governments decided to
call the text resulting from the Paris Agreements
a " modified treaty " and not a " revised treaty "
is a clear indication. in semantic terms, of their
intention not to rectify a text but to change its
form, substance and sense, in a word to change
it into something new.
81. Everything indicates that it is for reasons
of expediency that most governments intend to
subscribe to the tendentious interpretation
according to whrch the date is 1998. In some
cases, it is a matter of terminating as soon as
possible any clauses that bother them and that
they no longer respect. In other cases, they are
probably motivated by more general reasons,
particularly the idea that WEU's activities
should be brought to an end and handed over to
the European Community in conditions which
are still unclear. However legally questionable
may be the grounds for this approach, it shows
that it is urgent to revise the treaty and that thrs
revision must include the removal of provisions
which are no longer applied and make it possible
to establish closer links between WEU and the
organs of the Twelve. This is the twofold aim of
the proposals made here.
82. Finally, Article YI5.4 of the draft treaty
drawn up by the Commission and its relevant
comment should be recalled:
" Paragraph 4 confirms the long-term
objective of integrating the WEU into the
union and for this purpose uses Article
XII of the revised 1948 Treaty of Brussels.
At the end of the fifty-year time limit set
in that article, the contracting parties each
have the right to withdraw. subject to one
year's notice. This will give a chance to
take stock of security co-operation with a
view to the eventual integration of the
WEU into the union. "
It should first be noted that the 1948 Brussels
Treaty contained no Article XII but that it is the
former Article X which became Article XII of
the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty. The Com-
mission thus confuses the two treaties even
more than the Council does, thus strengthening
the position that member countries may
withdraw from the modified Brussels Treaty on
the earlier date. What is more serious is that it
bases the integration of WEU in the union on
the former's disbandment, vrhich is just the
opposite of the doctrine constantly defined by
our Assembly. While the Comrnission's proposal
mentions relations between WEU and the
European Council, these rel:rtions are placed
under the exclusive control of the European Par-
liament and no reference is nlade to the WEU
Assembly, thus clearly indical.ing that a merger
implies the disappearance of WEU in 1998.
83. Where the drafting of r\rticle XII is con-
cerned, your Rapporteur had proposed to
sidestep the juridical discur;sion by deleting
from the second paragraph the phrase " and
shall thereafter remain in for,;e for fifty years "
and from the third paragraph the phrase " After
the expiry ofthe period offiftv years ". replacing
" shall have " by " has " in bo'th cases. However,
the Political Committee decided not to follow its
Rapporteur but to specify that in its opinion the
treaty could not be denounced by any of its sig-
natories for fifty years starting from the entry
into force of the Paris Agreements. It therefore
adopted the following wording for the second
and third sentences of Article XII:
" [The treaty] shall be considered to enter
into force on the date of the deposit of the
last instrument of ratification of the 1954
Paris Agreements and rvill remain in force
for fifty years. After thr: expiry of the fifty
years, each of the high contracting parties
shall have the right to cease... "
Y. Conclusic,ns
84. Your Rapporteur's proposed drafting of a
new text of the treaty meets two aims:
(i) to ensure that member countries con-
tinue to have the means necessary for
their joint security, while respecting
each one's particular concernsl
(ii) to allow the integration of the treaty
itself and the organs it created. i.e.
WEU. in the framework of a more
complete organisation of Europe
such as the European union whose
establishment is the declared aim of
all the member countries.
85. A question arose as to whether the new
text should be more explicit in four respects:
(, relations between WEU and NATO;
(ii) relations between WEU and the
organs associating the Twelve, or
even the future integration of WEU
among these organs;




(it) inlegration into the treaty of the prin-
ciples of the platform of The Hague
relating to the organisation of
European security.
86. Your Rapporteur reached a negative con-
clusion on all four points for the following
reasons:
(i) While all the governments agree that the
new circumstances in Europe have made it
necessary to reorganise NATO, present uncer-
tainty about how these circumstances will
develop make it extremely difficult to hold a
debate in WEU that should be held in NATO.
As proposed, the treaty makes it binding on
member countries to do their utmost to
maintain and ensure the smooth running of that
organisation. It cannot be more precise.
(ii) Where the CSCE is concerned, there is
similar uncertainty about how it will be able to
organise a new order of peace and security in
Europe. One cannot commit member countries
on the basis of guesses about its future.
(iii) In regard to the institutions of the Twelve,
the Nine must place no obstacles in the way of
WEU's possible integration in a European
union, but it is not for them to say what this
union should be. Ii as it appears, the govern-
ments wish here and now to build " bridges "
between WEU and NATO. on the one hand, and
WEU and the Community. on the other. the
Brussels Treaty must give them the juridical
basis for doing so. It cannot determine what
these bridges will be.
(iv) Finally, with the adoption of the platform
of The Hague. the governments showed that
they were capable, in case of need, of defining
the new requirements of European security on
the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty. To
specify, in changing circumstances, what these
requirements will be in the future would be to
take the risk of proposing a treaty which might
be out of date by the time it was ratified. This
does not mean that as long as it is useful the
platform should not remain the basis for WEU's
work to which any new candidate countries will
have to accede. as did Portugal and Spain.
81. Thus, the text your Rapporteur is pro-
posing has eliminated everything which he con-
sidered archaic in the treaty. It has added or
been more specific about a few new directions,
without linking WEU too strictly with organisa-
tions which are, in spite of everything, outside
it. He has, however, attempted to make the most
of what he believes to be essential: the com-
pulsory mutual assistance clause and the clause
which opens the door to all forms of co-operation
with a view to organising joint security.
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